UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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ANTWAUN CURRY, :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : 24-CV-1619 (SFR)
:
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY :
and STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE :
INSURANCE COMPANY, :
:
Defendants. x
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff Antwaun Curry obtained a substantial default judgment in Connecticut
Superior Court against Michael Rodrigues and Xiomara Rios after Rios drove Rodrigues’ car
into a car where Curry was a passenger. Curry now seeks to recover from Rodrigues’ insurer,
Defendants State Farm Fire & Casualty Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company (together “State Farm” or “Defendants”). State Farm filed a motion to
dismiss all of Curry’s claims. For the reasons that follow, I deny State Farm’s motion to
dismiss in part and grant the motion in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges as follows. On February 14, 2021, Curry sustained injuries after
a car driven by Xiomara Rios rear-ended the car where Curry was a passenger. Compl. 2, ¶¶
11-13, ECF No. 1.1 Rios was driving with the express permission of Michael Rodrigues. Id. at
2, ¶ 12. Rodrigues’ car was insured by Defendants. Id. at 2, ¶¶ 6-9. Through the policy, and
1 When citing to the Complaint, I cite to the pagination contained within the filing rather than to
the internal pagination set by ECF.
other representations, Defendants promised to defend Rodrigues in any lawsuit where the
factual allegations contained in the complaint might potentially fall within the scope of
coverage. Id. at 2, ¶ 9. The policy remained in effect on the date of the collision. Id. at 2, ¶ 14.
Through counsel, Curry notified State Farm of Curry’s claim on June 11, 2021, and
provided a copy of the police report. Id. at 3, ¶ 16. Curry’s counsel sent a demand letter to
State Farm on August 2, 2021. Id. at 3, ¶¶ 18-19. Defendants responded on August 30, 2021,
that they could not accept or deny the demand “due to a coverage question on the file.” Id. at
3, ¶ 20. Curry’s counsel responded by sharing a copy of a civil lawsuit complaint against Rios
and Rodrigues, which was ultimately filed in Connecticut Superior Court on November 5,
2021. Id. at 3-4, ¶¶ 21-24. The state lawsuit asserted a single cause of action for negligence
against Rios and Rodrigues.2 Rios and Rodrigues did not appear in the state court action. See
id. at 5, ¶ 33.
On May 22, 2022, State Farm’s adjuster wrote to Curry’s counsel to inform him that
Defendants had denied coverage related to the accident. Id. at 5, ¶ 32. On March 17, 2023,
Curry’s counsel wrote to State Farm to inform them of an upcoming hearing on damages. Id.
at 5, ¶ 33. On August 22, 2023, Curry obtained an award in the state court action of
$459,435.24 in compensatory and punitive damages against Rios and Rodrigues. Id. at 5, ¶ 34.
That award remains wholly unsatisfied. Id. at 6, ¶ 38.
2 I take judicial notice of the Connecticut state court complaint attached to Curry’s response to the
motion to dismiss. Pl.’s Mem. 18-22. Courts may look beyond the pleadings to consider a fact that
is subject to judicial notice or is contained within a document that is integral to the complaint. Pani
v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 1998); Cortec Industries, Inc. v. Sum
Holding L.P.,
949 F.2d 42 , 47 (2d Cir. 1991). The state court complaint attached to Curry’s
response is identical to that which appears on the docket of the Connecticut Superior Court. Curry
v. Rios, No. FBT-CV21-6111761-S (Conn. Sup. Dec. 8, 2021).
Curry brought the present action against State Farm in Connecticut Superior Court on
September 6, 2024. Id. at 1. Defendants removed to federal court on October 10, 2024. Notice
of Removal, ECF No. 1. Counts 1 and 4 sound in breach of contract for State Farm’s refusal
to defend Rodrigues in the state court action. Counts 2 and 5 assert that State Farm breached
its duty of good faith and fair dealing by refusing to provide an immediate defense to
Rodrigues, refusing to settle within the policy limits, and refusing to indemnify Rodrigues for
the judgment. Counts 3 and 6 assert that State Farm was unjustly enriched by accepting
premium payments and then declining to defend Rodrigues in the state court action and
refusing to pay the judgment.3
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and memorandum of law on October 22, 2024.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. and State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to
Dismiss. Pl.’s Compl., (“Defs.’ Mem.”), ECF No. 15. Curry timely responded on December
11, 2024. Pl.’s Obj. & Mem. in Opp. to Defs.’ Oct. 22, 2024, Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Mem.”),
ECF No. 21. Defendant replied on December 23, 2025. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. and
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss (“Reply”), ECF No. 22. I
heard oral argument on the motion on May 28, 2025. ECF No. 39.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The standard governing motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is well established. To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 ,
3 Counts 1, 2, and 3 are brought against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance while counts 4,
5, and 6 are brought against State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. At oral argument, Curry’s
counsel confirmed that the mirrored counts (1 and 4, 2 and 5, 3 and 6) are otherwise identical.
678 (2009); Kim v. Kimm,
884 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2018); Lapaglia v. Transamerica Cas.
Ins. Co.,
155 F. Supp. 3d 153, 155-56 (D. Conn. 2016). Although this “plausibility”
requirement is “not akin to a probability requirement,” it “asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 . The court must “draw all
reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to
be true, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Faber v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011). However, the court is not bound to accept
“conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.” Rolon v.
Henneman,
517 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2008).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Breach of Contract
Curry asserts that he is a judgment creditor pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-321
entitled to enforce the insurance policy issued by State Farm to Rodrigues. Counts 1 and 4 of
the Complaint assert that State Farm breached the policy by failing to defend Rodrigues in the
state court action. Compl. 1-6, 18-23. In its briefing, State Farm argues that a judgment creditor
like Curry cannot recover pursuant to Connecticut’s direct action statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. §
38a-321, because the policy agreement excluded intentional wrongful acts by the insured as
well as events where the insured failed to cooperate with State Farm’s investigation. Reply 1-
2.4 Curry maintains that the court must take his well-pleaded allegations as true and Defendants
4 In its opening brief, State Farm asserted that Curry cannot recover for breach of contract because
he was not a party to the insurance contract between Rodrigues and Defendants. Defs.’ Mem. 5-6.
However, State Farm acknowledged in its reply brief and at oral argument that Conn. Gen. Stat. §
38a-321 allows third-party actions.
are estopped from pursuing the exclusions argument because Defendants breached their duty
to defend Rodrigues in the state court action. Pl.’s Mem. 8-11.
Connecticut’s direct action statute permits a third party such as Curry to enforce the
provisions of State Farm’s insurance agreement, even though Curry was not a party to the
contract. The direct action statute provides in relevant part that:
Upon the recovery of a final judgment against any person . . . for loss or
damage on account of bodily injury or death or damage to property, if the
defendant in such action was insured against such loss or damage at the time
when the right of action arose and if such judgment was not satisfied . . .
such judgment creditor shall be subrogated to all rights of the defendant and
shall have a right of action against the insurer to the same extent that the
defendant in such action could have enforced his claim against such insurer
had such defendant paid such judgment.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-321; see also Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co.,
235 Conn. 185,
198 (1995) (explaining that “the intention of the statute is to give to the judgment creditor the
same rights under the policy as the assured”) (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted). The Connecticut Supreme Court has established three requirements that a judgment
creditor must satisfy to bring a claim against an insurer pursuant to § 38a-321: “‘(1) that the
plaintiff has recovered a final judgment; (2) that the judgment is against a person who was
insured by the defendant against liability on it; and (3) that the judgment remains unsatisfied.’”
Tucker v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc.,
936 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D. Conn. 2013) (quoting Skut v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co.,
142 Conn. 388, 393 (1955)). The allegations in the Complaint
satisfy all three requirements.
The duty to defend is independent of and broader than the obligation to indemnify.
Nash St., LLC v. Main St. Am. Assurance Co.,
337 Conn. 1, 9 (2020). An insurer has a duty to
defend its insured if “at least one allegation of the complaint falls even possibly within the
coverage.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Netherlands Ins. Co.,
312 Conn. 714, 739
(2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the insured defaults, the judgment creditor
may sue the insurer for breach of contract for failing to defend the defaulted insured. Nash St.,
337 Conn. at 9. Here, the Complaint adequately pleads that Defendants breached the duty to
defend by declining to defend Rodrigues in Curry’s state court lawsuit. Curry says—and at
this stage I must accept as true—that Defendants promised to defend Rodrigues from claims
of negligence like those asserted in the state court complaint. Thus, Curry as a judgment
creditor can assert Rodrigues’ claim that Defendants breached the contract in failing to defend
in the state court action. See, e.g., Veilleux v. Progressive Nw. Ins. Co., No. 3:16-cv-2116
(MPS),
2018 WL 465773, at *2-5 (D. Conn. Jan. 18, 2018) (permitting judgment creditor to
bring various breach of contract claims against insurer pursuant to Connecticut’s direct action
statute after insurer declined to defend its insured).
State Farm contends that its duty to defend was excused in this instance because Rios
engaged in intentional wrongful acts not covered by State Farm’s policy and failed to cooperate
with State Farm’s investigation.5 Reply 2. But I am barred from looking beyond the pleadings
in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Roth v. Jennings,
489
F.3d 499 , 509 (2d Cir. 2007). Thus, I cannot determine on a motion to dismiss the contested
factual issue of whether Rios engaged in intentional wrongful conduct or negligence such that
5 As neither party has incorporated the policy agreement into its filings, I do not opine at this
juncture on what conduct is excluded from the policy.
the conduct here was excluded by the policy. Similarly, I cannot determine at the motion to
dismiss stage whether Rodrigues failed in any obligation to cooperate with State Farm.6
At oral argument, State Farm submitted an additional argument in support of dismissal.
State Farm asserted that the duty to defend an insured is triggered only when the insured
tenders the defense to the insurer. As the Complaint does not describe whether Rodrigues ever
tendered his defense in the state court action to the insurer, State Farm says that Curry fails to
state a claim for breach of the duty to defend.7 I disagree.
It is certainly true that many cases brought in the direct action context arise after the
insured was rebuffed in tendering defense to the insurer. See, e.g., Capstone Bldg. Corp. v.
Am. Motorists Ins. Co.,
308 Conn. 760, 809 (2013); Nash Street, LLC, 337 Conn. at 25-26
(holding that an insurer owes its insured a duty to defend if, “[a]t the time [the insured] tendered
defense of the underlying action to the [insurer], there was a possibility that the damages the
plaintiff alleged were covered by the policy”). But this does not mean that a complaint by a
6 I decline at this stage to address Curry’s argument that State Farm’s failure to defend the state
court action, if proven, estops State Farm from invoking the substantive exclusions of the insurance
policy.
7 At oral argument, Curry’s counsel objected to the tendering argument on the ground that it had
not been raised in State Farm’s motion to dismiss and thus Curry had not had an opportunity to
respond to the argument in his response brief. Although State Farm’s counsel contended that the
tendering argument had been raised in the briefs, it appears nowhere within State Farm’s opening
brief and is at best only suggested in a footnote to the Reply. See Reply 2 n.1 (“Mr. Rodrigues and
Ms. Rios never sought of [sic] defense from State Farm, but rather actively avoided helping the
investigation, thus, creating a fundamentally different situation than in Plaintiff’s relied upon case
law.”). As I conclude that the argument lacks merit in any event, I need not address whether it was
waived by the way it was presented. See D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(d) (“A reply memorandum must be
strictly confined to a discussion of matters raised by, and must contain references to the pages of,
the memorandum to which it replies.”); In re Harris,
464 F.3d 263 , 268 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006)
(Sotomayor, J.) (“We generally do not consider issues raised in a reply brief for the first time . . .
because if [a movant] raises a new argument in a reply brief a [non-moving party] may not have
an adequate opportunity to respond to it.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
judgment creditor must plead with particularity when and how the insured attempted to tender
defense to the insurer to survive a motion to dismiss. Instead, the Connecticut Supreme Court
has reiterated that the duty to defend is interpreted by reference to the complaint filed against
the insured, rather than to evidence of post-filing interactions between insured and insurer.
DaCruz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
268 Conn. 675, 687-88 (2004) (“‘It necessarily follows
that the insurer’s duty to defend is measured by the allegations of the complaint.’”) (quoting
Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,
264 Conn. 688, 711-12 ,
(2003)); Missionaries of Co. of Mary v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
155 Conn. 104, 110 (1967)
(same).
I may ultimately consider evidence relating to when or if Rodrigues tendered his
defense to State Farm in deciding whether State Farm breached its duty to defend. See
Capstone, 308 Conn. at 815 (“[T]he proper inquiry [in assessing a claim for breach of the duty
to defend] is whether the insurer would have had the duty to defend against each claim,
contained in the complaint or fairly discernible from the demand for defense, when considered
independently.”); see also Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
274 Conn.
457, 467 (2005) (holding that an insurer must provide a defense “when it has actual knowledge
of facts establishing a reasonable possibility of coverage”) (citation omitted). But the case law
does not support State Farm’s assertion that a complaint in the direct action context for breach
of the duty to defend can survive a motion to dismiss only when the complaint specifically
asserts that the insured tendered a defense to the insurer.
Furthermore, the tendering obligations are presumably governed by the policy
agreement issued by State Farm to Rodrigues. See Nash Street, LLC, 337 Conn. at 17
(construing the policy agreement on a motion for summary judgment to determine whether the
duty to defend had been triggered). But the policy agreement is not before me. Nor can I decide
the fact-sensitive question of whether Rodrigues and State Farm performed their respective
obligations under the policy on a motion to dismiss. See Baldia v. RN Express Staffing Registry
LLC,
633 F. Supp. 3d 693, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (declining to decide the disputed issue of
performance under the contract on a motion to dismiss).
Accordingly, I find that Curry has adequately pleaded that State Farm breached its duty
to defend Rodrigues in the state court action.
B. Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Counts 2 and 5 of the Complaint assert claims of breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing. Compl. 6-12, 23-29.8 Curry says that State Farm acted with “design to mislead or
deceive, and willful intent to breach or frustrate the terms of the Insurance Policy, not prompted
by honest mistake but by motive to illegally deny Michael Rodrigues his contractual and legal
rights.”
Id. at 11, ¶ 38. Curry’s allegations regarding bad faith overlap significantly with those
related to breach of contract, but he asserts that State Farm acted in bad faith by:
a) intentionally and willfully refusing to fully to [sic] provide an
immediate defense to Michael Rodrigues when there was no doubt that the
allegations in the Lawsuit complaint triggered a duty to defend;
b) intentionally and willfully refusing to settle the Lawsuit within the
Rodrigues Policy limits after offers to settlement [sic] the Lawsuit within the
applicable policy limits had been made, and;
c) intentionally and willfully refusing to indemnify Michael Rodrigues
for the Judgment after refusing to immediately defend him when there was no
doubt that the allegations in the Lawsuit complaint triggered the duty to defend.
8 As described in note 3, supra, Count 2 asserts a claim against Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance and Count 5 asserts a claim against Defendant State Farm Fire & Casualty
Company. The counts are otherwise identical.
Id. at 12, ¶ 38(a)-(c).
State Farm says the Complaint contains only conclusory statements that fail to state a
claim of bad faith. Defs.’ Mem. 7-9. In particular, State Farm notes that Curry has not pleaded
any facts that would support the inference that Defendants had a sinister or dishonest motive
in declining to promptly defend Rodrigues. Id. at 8. Curry responds by pointing to a broader
definition of bad faith and observing: “Rarely do the perpetrators of bad faith conduct
announce their bad faith intent openly, and proof of such conduct is almost always made by
circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 12. Curry asserts that State Farm had no valid excuse for
declining to defend the state court negligence action because the state court complaint alleged
conduct clearly within the scope of State Farm’s duty to defend. Id. at 13. Curry maintains that
it is not reasonable for State Farm to delay six months to determine if the allegations in the
short state court complaint might possibly fall within the liability coverage in the applicable
policy. Id. Curry accuses State Farm of “tread[ing] water, in the face of a simple negligence
claim in the 2021 Lawsuit, to find any excuse to deny the claim.” Id. These circumstances,
Curry asserts, adequately support the bad faith inference at this stage of the case. Id. at 11-14.
Every contract carries an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requiring that
neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreement. Habetz v. Condon, 224 Conn. 231, 238 (1992). To make out “a cognizable claim
of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, [the plaintiff must allege that]
‘the acts by which a defendant allegedly impedes the plaintiff’s right to receive benefits that
he or she reasonably expected to receive under the contract [were] taken in bad
faith.’” Calhoun v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
204 F. Supp. 3d 436, 442 (D. Conn.
2016) (quoting De La Concha of Hartford, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
269 Conn. 424, 433
(2004)). Bad faith encompasses “both ‘actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or
deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not
prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister
motive.’” Habetz,
224 Conn. at 237 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)). “‘Bad
faith means more than mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose.’” De La Concha of
Hartford, Inc.,
269 Conn. at 433 (quoting Habetz,
224 Conn. at 237 ).
Bad faith can be inferred where the insurer denied a contractual benefit on a pretextual
basis or in violation of a statutory obligation. Veilleux,
2018 WL 465773, at *5-6. Similarly, a
claim asserting bad faith that suggests the insurer deliberately denied a contractual benefit it
knew it owed to the insured will survive a motion to dismiss. Belz v. Peerless Ins. Co.,
46 F.
Supp. 3d 157, 165 (D. Conn. 2014); see also Stein v. AIX Specialty Ins. Co., No. HHD-cv-
206123957S,
2020 WL 8024884, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2020). Pleading that an
insurer attempted to mislead the insured regarding their rights under the contract also supports
an inference of bad faith. Gabriel v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 3:14-cv-1435-VAB,
2015
WL 5684063, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2015). Finally, an “insurer’s failure to adequately
investigate, evaluate and settle may provide the basis for a bad faith claim.” Smith v. Home
State Ins. Co. SPC, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-1046 (RNC),
2013 WL 12284914, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar.
31, 2013). On the other hand, “[a]llegations of a mere coverage dispute or negligence by an
insurer in conducting an investigation will not state a claim for bad faith against an
insurer.” Martin v. American Equity Ins. Co.,
185 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165 (D. Conn. 2002).
Liberally construed, the Complaint states a plausible claim of bad faith denial of State
Farm’s duty to defend Rodrigues. Curry alleges that State Farm knew it owed a duty to
immediately defend Rodrigues because it could see from the state court complaint that Curry’s
claim against Rodrigues was plainly within the scope of coverage. Nonetheless, rather than
defend Rodrigues, State Farm delayed six months in order to engineer an excuse to invoke one
of the policy exclusions. These allegations, if proven, could support an inference that State
Farm willfully breached its duty to defend. See Stein,
2020 WL 8024884, at *3 (denying
motion to dismiss on claim that insurer engaged in bad faith by looking beyond complaint to
find excuse to avoid defending insured).
But I do not find that the Complaint plausibly states a claim of bad faith relating to
State Farm’s decision to invoke a policy exclusion as the basis for not settling Curry’s state
court lawsuit or indemnifying Rodrigues. See Compl. 12, ¶ 38(b)-(c). Unlike in Veilleux, Curry
does not assert that State Farm denied a claim for coverage on a pretextual basis. Curry has
not suggested that State Farm conducted an inadequate investigation into his claim. Nor is
there any allegation that State Farm sought to mislead Rodrigues or Curry regarding the status
of its investigation or the basis for its denial of coverage. See Martin,
185 F. Supp. 2d at 165
(granting dismissal because plaintiff failed to describe how denial of coverage was
“unreasonable, outrageous, malicious, and done in bad faith”). Nor has Curry plausibly
asserted that State Farm violated public policy or some other statutory duty by declining to
settle Curry’s claim or file a declaratory judgment action against Rodrigues. See Nash Street,
LLC, 337 Conn. at 22 (“Although our case law does not require it, the prudent, if not ordinary,
course would have been for the defendant to defend its insured under a reservation of rights
and separately pursue a declaratory judgment action to resolve the legal uncertainty at issue.”).
Accordingly, Curry has adequately pleaded a bad faith claim only to the extent he
alleges that State Farm acted in bad faith by declining to promptly defend Rodrigues in the
state court action. See Compl. 12, ¶ 38(a).
C. Unjust Enrichment
Counts 3 and 6 assert that Defendants were unjustly enriched by their decision not to
defend or indemnify Rodrigues in the state court action.9 Id. at 13-18, 30-35.10 Defendants
respond that Curry cannot seek equitable remedies rooted in the quasi-contractual relationship
between State Farm and Rodrigues. Defs.’ Mem. 8-9. Curry maintains that Conn. Gen. Stat. §
38a-321 entitles him as a judgment creditor to recover against State Farm for equitable
remedies in addition to claims for breach of contract. Pl.’s Mem. 14-15.
I find State Farm’s argument to be without merit. Connecticut’s direct action statute
permits Curry as a judgment creditor to assert whatever causes of action would be available to
the insured against the insurer. This includes equitable remedies such as unjust enrichment.
See Veilleux,
2018 WL 465773, at *2-3 (rejecting argument that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-321
supplanted common law remedies). I therefore deny State Farm’s motion to dismiss counts 3
and 6 of the Complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, State Farm’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to State
Farm’s bad faith denial of coverage claims alleged in counts 2 and 5, DENIED as to State
9 Curry’s counsel clarified at oral argument that the unjust enrichment claim is an alternative path
to recovery in the event he were prevented from pursuing the breach of contract claims. A plaintiff
is of course permitted to plead in the alternative at this stage. See Henry v. Daytop Vill., Inc.,
42
F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[A] plaintiff may plead two or more statements of a claim, even within
the same count, regardless of consistency.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) (“A party may set out 2 or
more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or
defense or in separate ones.”).
10 Counts 3 and 6 of the Complaint are identical except as to the identity of the defendant.
Farm’s bad faith denial of the duty to defend claims alleged in counts 2 and 5, and DENIED
with respect to all other counts.
SO ORDERED.
New Haven, Connecticut
June 6, 2025
/s/Sarah F. Russell
SARAH F. RUSSELL
United States District Judge