Case Information: 96-CO-1424 | |||
Short Caption: | CHARLES E. JONES V. UNITED STATES | Classification: | Appeals - Criminal Other - Other Criminal |
Superior Court or Agency Case Number: | F8651-96 | Filed Date: | 10/22/1996 |
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Opening Event Date: | 10/22/1996 | Case Status: | Closed |
Record Completed: | Post-Decision Matter Pending: | ||
Briefs Completed: | |||
Argued/Submitted: | |||
Disposition: | Next Scheduled Action: | ||
Mandate Issued: | 06/06/1997 | ||
Costs Waived |
Party Information | |||||||||
Appellate Role | Party Name | IFP | Attorney(s) | Arguing Attorney | E-Filer | ||||
Appellant | Charles E. Jones | Y |
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Appellee | United States | N |
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Events | ||||
Event Date | Status | Description | Result | |
10/22/1996 | NOTICE OF APPEAL filed by: James Klein | |||
10/30/1996 | ORDER: IT APPEARING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, IT IS ORDERED THAT JAMES W. KLEIN, ESQUIRE IS HEREBY APPOINTED TO REPRESENT APPELLANT IN THIS APPEAL. APPELLANT'S DOCKETING STATEMENT SHALL BE FILED WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS ORDER. (Wagner) | |||
10/31/1996 | APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL | |||
11/04/1996 | SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD #1 (6 PGS.\L. RUST-PROC.10/3/ 96). | |||
11/05/1996 | TMC - Aplt's motion for summary reversal | |||
11/07/1996 | APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE | |||
11/12/1996 | APPELLANT'S DOCKETING STATEMENT (RT ordered) | |||
11/13/1996 | APPELLANT'S OPPOSITION to aple's mot for summary affirmance | |||
11/27/1996 | ORDERED that this matter is scheduled for argument before this division on December 3, 1996, at 3:00 p.m. The parties are to be present in the Distirct of Columbia Court of Appeals courtroom, located on the sixth floor, at 2:55 p.m. on that date. (b y: STFABE) | |||
11/29/1996 | ORDERED that this court's Nobember 27, 1996 order is hereby vacated. (by: STFABE) | |||
11/29/1996 | ORDERED that this court has examined the submissions of the parties and, in particular, the written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Detention Pending Trial entered by the trial court on October 11, 1996. The court has determined that its review may be aided critically by express findings by the trial curt, which heard the testimony of the witnesses, on (a) whether or not the weight of the evidence that the defendant committed the charged crimes exceeds probable cause; and (b) if so, on what basis the court makes its findings. The trial court's written order states that the weight of the evidence against the defendant is particularly strong. On the other hadn, the Court twice struck language from the order as drafted (apparently by the government) stating that there is a substantial probability that the defendant committed the chaged crimes, and substituted the words probable cause. We recognize the possibility that this change reflects nothing more that the trial court's conclusion that the government had cited an inapplicable section of the pretrial detention statute (i.e. D.C. Code 23-1322 (c), creating a rebuttable presumption of dingerousness upon finding of substantial probability of the commission of specific crimes). Nor do we require the trial court to quantify the weight of the evidence or to affix a particular label (such as substantial probability) to the evidence in determining whether it exceeded probable cause. The findings referred to above, however, are important enough to this court's review that we conclude the record should not be left ambiguous with respect to them See Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 n.5 (D.C. 1989) (en banc) (not deciding whether impremissible 'bootstrapping' would occur were the government to rely exclusively on probable cause plus the circumstances of the charged crime to show dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence). Accordingly, we direct that the record be remanded to permit the trial court to make the explicit findings set forth above. The trial court is requested to give this matter expedited consideration. The Superior Court Clerk shall transmit any further order of the trial court as a supplemental record. (by: STFABE) | |||
11/29/1996 | CASE STAYED (record remanded) | |||
12/04/1996 | RECEIVED - copy of ord in sup crt dtd 12/3/96 | |||
12/04/1996 | PROCEED WITH APPEAL, NO LONGER ON HOLD/STAYED | |||
12/09/1996 | RECEIVED Superior Court- Felony Branch order dated December 3, 1996 | |||
12/11/1996 | AFFIRMED Opinion | |||
12/23/1996 | APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC | |||
01/08/1997 | ORDER directing appellee within 20 days from the date of this order to file a response to pet for reh en banc (10 copies). (WA) | |||
01/21/1997 | RECEIVED record on appeal | |||
01/24/1997 | APPELLEE MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE OPPOSITION to appellant's petition for rehearing en banc until February 4, 1997. (unopposed) | |||
01/29/1997 | APPELLEE'S MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MOTION to deny pet. for reh en banc as moot | |||
01/30/1997 | ORD GRT APLE MO TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE OPPOSITION to pet for reh en banc on or before Feb. 4, 1997. (WA) | |||
02/03/1997 | APPELLANT'S OPPOSITION to aple's mot. to deny as moot aplt's pet for reh en banc | |||
03/07/1997 | ORDER On consideration of aplt's pet for reh en banc, aple's motion to deny as moot aplt's pet for reh en banc, and aplt's opposition thereto, it is Ordered that aple's motion is denied. It is FO that aple, within 14 days from the date of this order, shall file a response to aplt's pet for reh en banc (10 copies). (EB) | |||
03/17/1997 | APPELLEE'S OPPOSITION to pet for reh en banc | |||
05/29/1997 | ORDER DENYING APLT PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC (EB) (Judge Ferren would grant rehearing en banc.) | |||
06/06/1997 | MANDATE ISSUED |